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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
DOUGLAS B. MALAR, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 44660 
 
          Kootenai County Case No.  
          CR-2012-1289 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Malar failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by 
revoking his probation, or by not further reducing his sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 
motion? 
 
 
Malar Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Malar pled guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol and, on May 14, 
2012, the district court entered its judgment imposing a unified sentence of five years, 
with two years fixed, but suspending the sentence and placing Malar on supervised 
probation for three years.  (R., pp.49-54.)  Four months later, Marlar’s probation officer 
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filed a report of violation alleging that Malar had violated his probation by failing to report 
to his probation officer, failing to report to the probation office, absconding supervision, 
failing to report for urinalysis testing, failing to complete the Victim’s Panel, failing to pay 
the costs of supervision, and consuming alcohol.  (R., pp.55-58.)  Malar admitted all 
seven allegations, and, in February 2013, the district court revoked his probation, 
ordered the underlying sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.76, 83-85.)  
After a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the balance of 
Marlar’s sentence and placed him on probation for a period of two years.  (R., pp.89-
91.) 
 Less than two months later, in August 2013, Marlar’s probation officer filed a 
report of violation alleging that Malar had violated his probation by consuming alcohol 
and committing the misdemeanor crimes of domestic battery and driving without a valid 
license.  (R., pp.92, 101-02.)  Malar admitted to having violated his probation by 
consuming alcohol, and the district court continued him on probation with the condition 
that he serve 90 days in jail with work release privileges.  (R. pp.101-02, 124-25.)   
 In June 2014, Malar again violated his probation by committing the misdemeanor 
crime of domestic battery in the presence of a child, avoiding supervision, changing 
residences without permission, consuming alcohol, and failing to pay the costs of 
supervision.  (R., pp.134-36, 147-49, 159 (admissions).)  The district court continued 
him on probation with the condition that he enroll in and successfully complete the 
Kootenai County Drug Court.  (R., pp.161-62.) 
 Less than three months later, in November 2014, Marlar’s probation officer filed a 
report of violation alleging that Malar had violated his probation by being terminated 
3 
 
from drug court, consuming alcohol, failing to report for urinalysis testing on seven 
separate occasions, and absconding supervision.  (R., pp.165-67.)  Malar admitted to all 
but the absconding allegation, and the district court finally revoked his probation and 
executed his sentence.  (R., pp.193, 196-98.)  Malar filed a timely Rule 35 motion for 
reduction of his sentence, which the district court granted by reducing the sentence from 
a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, to a unified term of only four years, 
with two years fixed.  (R., pp.199-200, 210-11.)  Following the reinstatement of his 
appeal rights pursuant to a post-conviction action, Marlar filed a timely notice of appeal.  
(R., pp.223-32.) 
Malar asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation in light of his claims that he was making progress while on probation and in 
programming, and that he has the support of his family and employers.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.3-4.)  Malar has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the district court. 
 State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992).  When deciding whether to 
revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether the probation [was] achieving 
the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of society.”  Drennen, 
122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701. 
Malar is not an appropriate candidate for probation.  Contrary to his claim that he 
was making progress on probation and in programming, Malar was actually terminated 
from the Kootenai County Drug Court, and repeatedly violated his probation by 
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consuming alcohol and absconding supervision. (R., pp.165-67.)  Malar has been given 
many chances to succeed on probation including by participating in a rider, but he 
continually violated his probation by, among other things, consuming alcohol and 
committing crimes of violence.  (R., pp.55-58, 83-85, 92, 134-36, 165-67.)  When 
ordering Malar to enroll in and successfully complete drug court the district court 
warned, “The drug court is the most intensive outpatient program we have, and if that 
doesn’t work, the only real option is custody.”  (8/28/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-14.)  Malar did 
not take advantage of the rehabilitative opportunity he had been given, however; the 
district court entered its order requiring Marlar to participate in drug court on August 29, 
2014, and by November 3, 2014, Malar was terminated from the program.  (R., pp.161-
62, 165.) 
At the disposition hearing for Malar’s most recent probation violation, the district 
court noted the many opportunities Malar had been given and stated, “Quite frankly, at 
this point, it’s up to you.  You can either use the tools we’ve given you or you will 
continue to have problems.”  (1/9/15 Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.1.) Probation was clearly not 
serving the purpose of rehabilitation in this case, as evinced by Malar's ongoing 
substance abuse and absconding behavior.  Neither was probation achieving the goal 
of community protection, given Malar’s multiple domestic abuse charges and refusal to 
comply with the terms of community supervision.  Malar’s continued criminal behavior, 
his refusal to comply with the conditions of community supervision, and his failure to 
make any rehabilitative progress while in the community did not merit continued 
probation.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Malar has failed to establish that the 
district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. 
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Malar next asserts the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing 
his sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  In State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court 
observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a sentence.”  The 
Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely 
a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  Thus, “[w]hen 
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n 
appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the 
underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 
442 (2008).   
Malar did not present any new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion.  Malar 
merely reminded the court that he wanted treatment, had support from his family, and 
was remorseful.  (3/27/15 Tr., p.9, L.2 – p.13, L.20.)  None of this was “new” 
information, as the district court was aware of all of these things at the time that it 
revoked Marlar’s probation.  (1/9/15 Tr., p.7, L.4 – p.8, L.2.)  Because Malar presented 
no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the 
motion that his sentence was excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, he has 
failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing his 
sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion. 
6 
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s orders 
revoking probation and granting Malar’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
       
 DATED this 24th day of July, 2017. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ALICIA HYMAS 
      Paralegal 
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